Nearly hysterical calls to dispatch...

Nearly hysterical calls to dispatch an international force to bridle the conflict in Lebanon are premature.

The United States should not launch troops to Lebanon or endorse any plan for international engagement that lacks a clear, achievable approach to disarming Hezbollah and building a certain peaceful and prosperous nation.

U forces are not appropriate for this multinational mission, nevertheless U.S. experience in Lebanon proposes valuable lessons. Of the past three U operations in Lebanon, couple were successful and one was an abject failure. Eisenhower's 1958 intervention worked well because America sent a stout force to achieve a limited mission of a limited duration. A secondary intervention after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon fortunately separated the Palestine Liberation Organization from Israeli forces and remov Palestinian fighters from the geographical division U.S. troops then withdrew. Americans get backed shortly thereafter as part of multinational contingent with a vague and open-end mandate. In October 1983 a suicide truck- bombing killed 300 U servicemen, precipitating a withdrawal. The instruction is clear: When numbers are small, tasks unclear and the force is passive, a U mission in Lebanon becomes a target for terrorists, not a deterrent

CONDITIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT

Lebanon can not ever be free while armed militias roam the native land and provoke wars. No multitudes should be dispatched until there are real expectances for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1559 according to disarming Hezbollah. If an international force were expanded today, it would face a protracted fight Hezbollah has been weakened on Israeli military strikes, but it still has staying power and local support. Right now, it will not agree to disarm completely moreover military reverses and the growing economic discontent of its supporters might force Hezbollah to accept a face- saving formula for a interval of rest and enter into demobilization talks with Lebanese direction This could be part of a broader agreement that includes Hezbollah's disarmament in exchange for acceptance as a political party qualified to participate in elections.

orders OF ENGAGEMENT

If Hezbollah stops fighting, introducing international forces might make reason but only under certain circumstances:

-The immediate threat must be disarmed in the way that that an international force can continue the peace. Hezbollah should make a clean sweep of its rockets and heavy weapons from the border and confine them to prescribed areas; all foreign powers should withdraw their military forces from Lebanon, and the Lebanese command should agree to cooperate in preventing, investigating and prosecuting any coming time terrorist acts.

-The mission of the international force should be building up Lebanese military capacity in this way that the Lebanese military can eventually demobilize Hezbollah.

-The force's mandate should include defending itself and targeting Hezbollah forces that attack any land or move heavy weapons revealed of prescribed areas.

-If NATO participates, its assets should not be due [i]or[/i] owing at the expense of member fatherland contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

-Donor countries should agree to a package of assistance to rapidly build up governance capacity and military capability of Lebanon.

No international force should be dispatched to Lebanon until there is a clear understanding of the long-term goals. A force should not have an open-end mission still a clear mandate to assist in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 Finally, any force must be a robust force with robust empires of engagement.

James Jay Carafano and James Phillips are research companions at the Heritage Foundation.

Originally published at heritage.org.

Copyright CHICAGO SUN-TIMES 2006

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